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INTRODUCTION
Patent litigation is a complex system wherein patent law is refined through
interactions among the judicial system’s constituent components—principally, the
litigants, district courts, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(Federal Circuit), Supreme Court, Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and
Congress’s patent laws.1 Typically, litigants pore over existing laws—both
congressional statutes and judicial opinions—to determine whether to file, defend,
or settle a patent suit in a district court. The district court rules on the litigants’
claims. When prompted by a losing litigant, the Federal Circuit—the appellate
court designated to hear nearly all appeals of patent cases2—reviews the district
court’s decision. Finally, the Supreme Court might entertain further review if it is

* Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. I thank Arnaud Ajdler, Dan Burk, T.J. Chiang, Colleen
Chien, Kevin Collins, Daniel Crane, Susan Crawford, Dennis Crouch, John Duffy, Rebecca
Eisenberg, Eric Goldman, Hugh Hansen, Bert Huang, Sonia Katyal, Peter Lee, Mark Lemley, Tyler
Ochoa, Joel Reidenberg, Michael Risch, David Schwartz, Ted Sichelman, and Joshua Walker, and
audiences at Santa Clara, University of California, Irvine, and University of Michigan law schools for
knowledgeable comments and suggestions.
1. Cf. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110, 113–15 (1991)
(applying chaos theory to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and suggesting that even though the
Court’s decisions seem random and unpredictable, ordered patterns are nonetheless present).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002) (carving out a limited exception for cases in which the patent issue arises
only in a counterclaim).
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convinced that the case is sufficiently worthy. This interaction is not
unidirectional. For example, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, in
articulating rules of patent law in its decisions, are or ought to be attentive to
making it straightforward for the district courts to apply these rules properly.3
Making sure that patent law develops appropriately in the courts requires attention
to each of the principal components of the litigation system and their interactions
with one another.
In their recent book The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It,4 Dan
Burk and Mark Lemley suggest that courts should and do tailor patent law to
particular technologies or industries, with the aim of providing appropriate
incentives to innovate under the specific circumstances. As Part I describes, their
book understandably focuses on the Federal Circuit’s key role in this tailoring. In
this Article, I seek to enhance their contributions by arguing that federal district
courts—which receive less attention in their book—are also particularly crucial for
the development and application of technology- and industry-specific patent rules.
Although district courts’ current handling of patent litigation underperforms in
many respects, I argue elsewhere that these flaws can be ameliorated by taking
advantage of patentography—the geography of patent disputes—to eliminate
forum shopping and cluster patent cases by industry or technology in those
districts where the particular industry or technology is already geographically
clustered.5 In Part II, I review this other work and build on it to suggest possible
improvements to the district courts’ practices and relationships that might be
fostered between the district courts and the Federal Circuit. These courts—two of
the most important components in the development of patent law—could interact
in advantageously symbiotic ways to tailor patent law to the particular needs of a
technology or industry. In doing so, I discuss how the limitations and advantages
of district courts and the Federal Circuit might each, respectively, be minimized
and enhanced by treating the district courts as the Federal Circuit’s patent
laboratories.
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S SUPERVISORY ROLE IN PATENT LAW
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley make three persuasive points in their book: that

3. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 805 (2008) (hypothesizing that the Federal Circuit might have molded
its legal rules to fit the district courts’ lack of expertise in patent law); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two
Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2010) (hypothesizing the same). Moreover, if the Federal Circuit fears
intervention by the Supreme Court, it might act preemptively to accede to the Supreme Court’s
perceived demands. Andrew S. Brown, Amgen v. HMR: A Case for Deference in Claim Construction, 20
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 479, 496 n.152 (2007).
4. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT (2009).
5. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 (2010).
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the flexible patent laws ought to be applied in technology-specific ways,6 that the
courts are the best (current) institution to do this refinement,7 and that the Federal
Circuit is already devising some technology-specific patent rules.8 Burk and
Lemley provide example after example of how varied technologies and industries
protectable by patent law operate in diverse ways and thus need different forms of
patent incentive to stimulate innovation in those areas. For instance, robust patent
protection is more important for industries with vast research and development
expenditures, like pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, so that they can recoup
their investments, than for those industries spending less, like software.9 As
another example, commercially available inventions that are self-disclosing, like
some software and mechanical devices, are more in need of patent protection as
they are more easily appropriable than are inventions that can be shielded, such as
some process inventions.10
While some might say that evidence of the technology or industry specificity
of innovation indicates that Congress or the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
ought to provide tailored patent rules for different technologies or industries,
Burk and Lemley argue against that position. They assert that patent statutes
tailored by Congress for different industries would create difficult problems of
discerning the industry to which different inventions belong.11 A profusion of
statutes would also be costly to write and would become outdated quickly, given
the rapid pace of technology and industry shifts.12 Moreover, tailored statutes
could easily fall prey to special-interest lobbying, rather than serve the general
public interest.13 In Burk and Lemley’s view, giving the PTO—the agency
responsible principally for patent issuance—the authority to tailor patent law
would not fare much better for similar reasons: concerns about special-interest
lobbying and the shortsightedness of an agency currently handling only limited
aspects of the patent system rather than infringement, licenses, and other
disputes.14
By contrast, Burk and Lemley argue that courts are best suited to tailor
patent law, mostly because the antagonistic litigation process occurs in particular
factual contexts, giving judges good information to make the best decisions about
advancing innovation.15 They highlight a number of ways that the Federal Circuit
6. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 39–92.
7. Id. at 95–107.
8. Id. at 109–30.
9. Id. at 39–41.
10. Id. at 42.
11. Id. at 97–98.
12. Id. at 98–99.
13. Id. at 99–100.
14. Id. at 106–07.
15. Id. at 104–05. Craig Nard additionally suggests that patent law throughout American
history has been dominated by the common law, rather than congressional action. Craig Allen Nard,
Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51 (2010).
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has already developed technology-specific patent rules to stimulate innovation
properly for different technologies. For example, the Federal Circuit applies the
patentability criterion of utility16 more strictly for biotechnology inventions than
those in other areas out of fear that biotechnologists will seek broad patents too
early in the research process, thereby cutting off important downstream research.17
As another illustration, how frequently inventions are found to be nonobvious—
another patentability criterion18—depends in part on the industry in which an
invention is created, given that it is measured by the degree of skill a person
having ordinary skill in the art has.19 Burk and Lemley also suggest a number of
areas in which the courts might create more technology-specific policy levers,20
such as with regard to consideration of the cost of innovation in determining an
invention’s nonobviousness.21
While Burk and Lemley convincingly argue that courts ought to be
developing industry- and technology-specific patent rules to optimize innovation
in its varying forms, their focus is almost entirely on one court: the Federal
Circuit.22 The Federal Circuit is, properly, a central judicial institution in any story
about patent litigation (or patent law, for that matter). Before 1982, appeals from a
district court’s patent decisions would go to its associated regional circuit court.
Congress changed that by creating the Federal Circuit.23 Since 1982, appeals from
decisions in cases in which jurisdiction arises under the patent laws lie exclusively
in the Federal Circuit,24 as do appeals from PTO decisions on patentability.25 In
practice, then, with few exceptions,26 the Federal Circuit is the only intermediate
appellate court reviewing district court decisions in patent cases. Moreover,
because the Supreme Court reviews relatively few patent cases27 and Congress
rarely revises the patent laws other than to codify judicial decisions,28 in practice,

16. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
17. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 110–12 (citing cases).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
19. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 114–17 (citing cases).
20. Id. at 131–65.
21. Id. at 131–33.
22. But see id. at 137–40 (describing how district courts are working toward a rule of making
the availability of injunctive relief dependent on the number of non-practicing entities in the relevant
industry). Pointedly, there are twenty-seven entries in the index related to the Federal Circuit, not to
mention many more on particular Federal Circuit cases, id. at 213, but none on district courts, id. at
212.
23. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
25. Id.
26. Supra note 2.
27. The small percentage of patent decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court holds even
taking into account a recent upsurge in the Supreme Court’s review of patent decisions. See XuanThao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 452 (2010).
28. Nard, supra note 15, at 53.
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the Federal Circuit is usually the last word on patent law.
Given its importance in patent law, Burk and Lemley’s focus on the Federal
Circuit is understandable. The Federal Circuit was, in fact, created so that it would
become the dominant judicial authority on patent law in two principal ways. One
impetus to centralizing all appeals in cases arising under the patent laws in the
Federal Circuit was to develop expertise in patent law’s complexities, thereby
improving the law’s accuracy.29 The second was to make patent law uniform
throughout the nation by having only one intermediate appellate court deciding
patent cases.30 That said, as Part II demonstrates, any theory of technology and
industry specificity in patent law should contemplate the role of district courts and
the relationships between those courts and the Federal Circuit.
II. DISTRICT COURTS AS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S PATENT LABORATORIES
Burk and Lemley’s almost exclusive focus on the Federal Circuit neglects the
vital role the district courts—in which most patent cases originate31 and
terminate32—ought to have in patent litigation. After demonstrating in Section A
the district courts’ pivotal role in patent law, Section B highlights the district
courts’ shortcomings in handling patent cases. Section C concludes with a
discussion of how district courts might improve in this regard and how the district
courts and the Federal Circuit might work together symbiotically—each doing
what it institutionally does best—to advance patent law. If the district courts can
be sufficiently bettered so as to serve as patent laboratories for the Federal Circuit,
patent law’s refinement in the courts ought to be much improved.
A. District Courts’ Centrality to Patent Law
Despite being marginalized, the district courts have a vital role to play in the
judicial development of patent law for at least three reasons. First, the district
court is almost always the only court to play a role in the over 2,600 patent cases
filed annually.33 Almost ninety percent of patent cases are settled in the district

29. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 14–20 (1989).
30. Id. at 8–14.
31. Federal Circuit patent cases can also originate in the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, which can “review adverse decisions of [patent] examiners upon applications for
patents and . . . determine priority and patentability of invention in interferences,” 35 U.S.C. § 6(b); id.
§ 141 (permitting appeal to the Federal Circuit), or the United States International Trade Commission,
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (2006).
32. PATSTATS.ORG, District Court Disposition Modes Patent Cases FY-2008, http://www.patstats
.org/2008fy_Patent_Case_Disposition_Modes.doc (last visited Apr. 29, 2010); infra text
accompanying note 34.
33. According to the Stanford Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse, 2634 district
court patent cases were filed in 2009. LEX MACHINA, http://www.lexmachina.com (last visited Sept.
21, 2010).
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court.34 Of the small remaining number that are adjudicated on the merits,35 only
about half are appealed to the Federal Circuit,36 leaving the district courts as the
final arbiters on patent law in the other half. Second, even when the Federal
Circuit reviews a district court’s patent decision, it typically does not review all of
the issues decided by the district court.37 Moreover, for those that it does review,
the Federal Circuit, at least in theory, must heavily defer to the district courts’
factual findings, whether made by a judge in a bench trial38 or a jury in a jury
trial.39 Because these factual determinations can strongly influence the contours of
legal determinations in patent law, the district court’s factual findings can have a
substantial impact on the Federal Circuit’s legal decisions. Third, if the district
courts are doing a poor—or even an inconsistent—job at deciding patent cases,
the Federal Circuit becomes hard-pressed to direct its resources efficiently to
make good patent law.40
These reasons underscore how important the district courts are to any robust
judicial development of technology or industry specificity in patent law, as
proposed by Burk and Lemley. For one thing, given that most district courts are
the only judicial actor involved in nearly all patent cases, these courts have a
critical role in ruling on the merits and guiding parties toward settlement. To
perform these tasks properly, the district courts must succeed in three areas: (1)
ascertaining the relevant facts in a particular case; (2) deciding whether patent law
as already worked out—by statute or judicial construction of the statute—already
governs the case’s facts; and (3) if not, gauging what rule should govern these
facts. Each of these steps taken by the district courts is important to a sensible
development of patent law’s technology or industry specificity. Germane to a
particular patent case are many types of facts: those concerning the case itself; the
parties’ industry (or industries), such as pharmaceutical, software, automotive, or
retail; and the technology at issue in the relevant patent, such as biotechnology,
software, or mechanical devices. To come to a proper legal conclusion, district
34. PATSTATS.ORG, supra note 32.
35. Id.
36. Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges
Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1193 (1999).
37. E.g., Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Co., 616 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Geo. M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Mach. Sys. Int’l, 618 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ring Plus, Inc.
v. Cingular Wireless Corp., 614 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010); King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc.,
616 F.3d 1267, 1273 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
38. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 809–11 (1986) (per curiam) (holding
that the Federal Circuit, like the other federal courts of appeal, must review factual findings in bench
trials deferentially for clear error) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)).
39. i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (ruling that jury
verdicts—always on factual issues—will be upheld so long as supported by substantial evidence), aff’d,
131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
40. Additionally, but less relevant here, on nonpatent issues, the choice of district court is
elevated in importance, as regional circuit law applies and local rules can affect strategies. See Massey
v. Del Labs., Inc., 118 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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courts must both correctly determine these facts and also focus their judicial
spotlight on the most relevant of them. Most pertinently, district courts must gain
sufficient understanding of the technology and industry at issue in any particular
case to determine whether and how existing law governs that case, and if not,
which of the plausible readings of patent law—should there be more than one—
best promotes innovation for the specific technology and industry at issue in the
case.
Even in the relatively infrequent case that an appeal is taken to the Federal
Circuit, the district courts are important to patent law’s technology and industry
specificity. That is, although the Federal Circuit will be crafting the law in a case,
perhaps to apply particularly to the technology or industry at hand, the district
court’s factual findings on that technology or industry ought to be receiving great
deference. In effect, the district courts must act as the Federal Circuit’s eyes and
ears—developing facts, determining testimonial credibility, and placing a case’s
facts in the context of a larger legal and economic picture in the first instance.
Finally, in their decisions, district courts can act as patent laboratories, using their
developed factual record to experiment with and develop industry- and
technology-specific patent rules, which the Federal Circuit could then evaluate on
appeal.
Given that the district courts must therefore occupy an important place in
developing an industry- and technology-specific patent law, I now turn to whether
the district courts are currently well-placed to do just that.
B. Current Shortcomings of the District Courts
Despite their centrality in patent litigation, the district courts are currently
not well suited to help the judicial system effectuate accurate technology- and
industry-specific patent law for at least three structural reasons. First, the factual
decision makers in the district courts typically do not have a sufficient
understanding of the technological and industry facts necessary to reach good
legal decisions in patent law. Second, most district court judges do not have a
sufficient understanding of the complexities of patent law to derive optimal legal
conclusions from properly found facts. Third, when district court decisions are
appealed to the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit frequently does not grant
sufficient deference to factual matters that have been properly found by
mislabeling them as legal issues.41 In this section, I consider these three concerns
in turn.
As discussed in the previous section, critical to any accurate technology- or
industry-specificity in patent law is having courts select which factual issues in a

41. There is the additional and significant problem with plaintiff forum shopping in patent
cases to find the most favorable district court for its case, often to the detrimental development of
patent law, an issue I take up in Fromer, supra note 5.
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patent case are relevant and determine those facts correctly. Recall that tailoring
patent law to a particular technology requires both an understanding of that
technology and the industry in which it operates to ascertain how patent law can
best advance innovation for that technology or industry.42 For example, consider a
sample of the many important factual issues that might need to be resolved in a
suit over the validity and infringement of a biotechnology patent.43 To determine
the patent’s scope, the district court must construe the patent’s claims from the
vantage point of a person having ordinary skill in that field,44 requiring an
understanding of what it takes for someone to be skilled in biotechnology and to
know how that person would comprehend the patent’s claims. To ascertain
whether infringement ought to be found beyond the patent claims’ literal meaning
pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents, the fact finder will need to decide whether
the alleged infringement operates in the same way as the patented invention.45
Whether the patented invention is nonobvious—one of the patentability
requirements46—and thus valid requires the court to decide whether a person
having ordinary skill in biotechnology would have found the invention to be
obvious in light of all relevant prior art.47 A court might also need to rule on
whether the patent holder has disclosed enough information about the invention
to satisfy patent law’s enablement requirement.48 To do so requires an
understanding of what people having ordinary skill in biotechnology do not
already know and cannot figure out without undue experimentation as to making
and using the invention.49 That information must be disclosed, and if not, the

42. Supra text accompanying notes 9–10.
43. For more on the importance of factual determinations in patent cases, see Fromer, supra
note 5, and Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
877 (2002).
44. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The Federal
Circuit has deemed this question to be a legal one, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998), although I think the question is predominantly factual. See infra text
accompanying notes 66–76.
45. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002)
(“The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the
claims described.”).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
47. Prior art is “[k]nowledge that is publicly known, used by others, or available on the date of
invention to a person of ordinary skill in an art, including what would be obvious from that
knowledge.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (8th ed. 2004). As with claim construction, the courts
consider nonobviousness to be a legal question with subsidiary factual ones. Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
48. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor
of carrying out his invention.”).
49. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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patent is invalid.50 Moreover, embedded in these questions of claim construction,
the doctrines of equivalents, nonobviousness, and enablement provide enough
wiggle room for policy choices about whether upholding the particular
biotechnology patent—and ones like it—promotes or impedes progress in the
technology and industry. Correctly deciding these legal and policy questions
requires a sharp and accurate understanding of the relevant technological and
industry facts.
In spite of the importance of accurate factual findings in patent cases, there
is good reason to believe that the two possible decision makers in patent cases in
district courts—judge and jury—are not well equipped to make these critical
technology- and industry-specific factual determinations. District court judges are
principally not technically trained—and even when they are, it is certainly not in
every area in which patents might be granted—making it very hard for them to
understand often complex patented technologies and the industries in which they
occur.51 Moreover, they typically do not accrue this proficiency on the bench by
repeated exposure to particular industries and technologies because, on average,
they tend to handle patent cases relatively infrequently.52
Jurors’ factual decision making seems to run into the same problems, as
jurors typically do not have backgrounds in technological areas.53 In fact, the
concern about juries as factual decision makers in patent cases is greater than it is
for district court judges in bench trials. Unlike district court judges, a lay juror is
unlikely to have repeated exposure to patent cases as a way to learn more about
particular technologies or industries. Empirical research, moreover, suggests that
there is cause for concern about juries’ factual determinations in patent cases.
Kimberly Moore shows that juries are less likely to differentiate among the various
legal challenges in a patent case by ruling in favor of the same party on all of its
claims significantly more frequently than do judges in bench trials.54 Finally, the
concern for jury fact-finding is further compounded by the dramatically growing
use of juries in patent cases: from 2.5% of all tried patent cases in 1940 to 59% of
them from 1997 through 1999.55
Apprehensions about district courts’ role in patent litigation extend beyond
50. Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1379 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
51. Rai, supra note 43, at 891–95.
52. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1097 (2003).
53. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 370–72 (2000) (describing the critique that jurors do not understand the
technologies at issue in patent cases); Richard B. Schmitt, Juries’ Role in Patent Cases Reconsidered, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 18, 1994, at B6.
54. Moore, supra note 53, at 403–04 (finding that, for cases involving multiple claims, juries
resolve all of those claims in favor of the same party eighty-seven percent of the time, while judges do
so just seventy-two percent of the time).
55. Id. at 366. That said, a low percentage of filed patent cases—under seven percent—reach a
trial. Id. at 383.
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their inadequacies in fact-finding to their shortcomings in properly deciding legal
issues in patent law. District court judges tend to lack backgrounds in patent law56
and see patent cases rarely.57 As such, district courts are unlikely to have a good
grasp of the law’s many intricacies.58 Pointedly, as Craig Nard observes, although
patent law is grounded in statute, “much like the Sherman Act, [it] is a common
law enabling statute, leaving ample room for courts to fill in the interstices or to
create doctrine emanating solely from Article III’s province.”59 Understanding
patent law well, then, requires a full-bodied knowledge of many Federal Circuit
and other patent decisions, something many district court judges lack. Therefore,
even when the facts in a patent case are properly found, there is a sizeable concern
that the district court will nonetheless err in its legal conclusions. Given that the
district court is more often than not the last court to make a legal ruling in a
patent case,60 any legal missteps it makes are significant.
Of course, these shortcomings in finding facts and deciding law should not
be viewed in isolation. The Federal Circuit reviews some patent cases.61 As such, it
might be seen to be in a position to correct some factual and legal errors made in
the district court. However, that is frequently not the case. As for factual findings
by district courts, the Federal Circuit is supposed to review them with a strong
degree of deference. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Federal Circuit, like
the other federal courts of appeal, must review factual findings in bench trials
deferentially for clear error.62 Relatedly, jury verdicts—always on factual issues—
are even harder to overturn on appeal, in that they will be upheld so long as
supported by substantial evidence.63 It is particularly hard for the Federal Circuit
to reverse juries’ factual errors. Juries typically do not articulate their factual
findings in any detailed way to ease appellate review. Even when special-verdict
forms are used, the questions answered by juries are relatively general, such as,
“Did the defendant prove the patent obvious by clear and convincing evidence?”64
The Federal Circuit can then do not much more than “presume that the jury
resolved the underlying factual disputes in favor of the verdict winner and leave
those presumed findings undisturbed if they are supported by substantial
evidence.”65
56. S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy and Other
Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 77–78.
57. Supra text accompanying notes 51–52.
58. E.g., Steve Seidenberg, Patent Rocket Docket, 93 A.B.A. J. 38, 38 (2007).
59. Nard, supra note 15, at 53.
60. Supra text accompanying notes 33–36.
61. Id.
62. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 809–11 (1986) (per curiam) (citing
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)).
63. i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct.
2238 (2011).
64. Moore, supra note 53, at 400–01.
65. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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That all said, there is evidence that the Federal Circuit has tended in practice
to give too little deference to district courts’ findings in factual matters in two
ways.66 First, there is suspicion that the Federal Circuit frequently engages in
searching review of district courts’ factual findings.67 Second, as Arti Rai suggests,
the Federal Circuit has mislabeled certain critical factual determinations as
questions of law, giving the Federal Circuit the opportunity to review them de
novo.68 Perhaps most affected in this regard is patent claim construction. Federal
Circuit Judge Plager labels claim construction the most important issue in patent
litigation, as its result often dictates the outcomes on infringement and validity
issues.69 Although claim construction might simplistically seem to be about
figuring out what the words in a patent document mean—making it seem like
statutory interpretation, a clear question of law—it is quintessentially about
discerning this meaning from the point of view of a person having ordinary skill in
the relevant art at the time of invention,70 which is a significant factual
undertaking. A district court undertaking claim construction might need to review
testimony by scientific and industry experts and documentary evidence about the
relevant technology, industry, and invention.71 This inquiry seems to be directed at
discerning facts: evaluating credibility, constructing who the person having
ordinary skill in the art is and what that person thought when the invention was
made, and making sense of the industry, technology, and invention.72 This critique
is so salient that six Federal Circuit judges recently suggested that the labeling of
claim construction as a question of law ought to be revisited.73 Similar critiques
have been aimed at various issues related to a patent’s validity, which have been
labeled as legal despite having overwhelming factual components.74
Any lack of deference by the Federal Circuit to the district courts on the
facts that they have found is problematic when the district court has made sensible

66. Fromer, supra note 5.
67. Rai, supra note 52, at 885–87. An empirical study by Kimberly Moore finds that, from
1993 through 1998, the Federal Circuit affirmed district court judges’ factual findings seventy-eight
percent of the time and juries’ factual findings seventy-eight percent of the time as well. Moore, supra
note 53, at 397.
68. Rai, supra note 43, at 879.
69. Plager, surpa note 56, at 71.
70. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
71. Rai, supra note 52, at 1089–90.
72. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 802.
73. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Following the Supreme Court’s holding that claim construction is not a jury question because it was
not analogous to any jury question at the United States’s founding, Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc.,
517 U.S. 370, 376–91 (1996), the Federal Circuit leaped to the conclusion that the Markman rule
requires that claim construction be a purely legal question, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1454–46 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This leap of logic was unwarranted, as something can be both a
nonjury and factual question. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1473–78 (Rader, J., dissenting).
74. Rai, supra note 52, at 885–87 (suggesting as much for the validity requirements of
nonobviousness and enablement).
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factual findings, particularly given that district courts are generally better situated
institutionally to determine facts.75 Some, though, point to the critique that district
courts are likely to err in finding the facts as justifying searching review by the
Federal Circuit, a court that comparatively has a better understanding of the issues
in patent cases.76
In all, this section demonstrates that the district courts are not currently well
suited to promote technology- or industry-specific development in patent law.
Even assuming that the Federal Circuit is best situated to develop technology- and
industry-specific patent law, as Burk and Lemley seem to suggest in their book,
the district courts must play a strong supporting role in this development.
Nevertheless, the district courts are currently inadequately equipped to do so.
Whether through judge or jury, there is reason to suspect that district courts might
not find technology- and industry-specific facts correctly, causing these courts to
misapply the Federal Circuit’s case law. Moreover, for the reasons set forth above,
district courts might not have a sufficiently refined understanding of the Federal
Circuit’s legal rules and how and whether to apply them in technology- and
industry-specific ways. Finally, in the cases in which the district courts have done a
good job at sussing out a case’s relevant technology- and industry-specific facts,
the Federal Circuit might improperly fail to defer to those findings.
Even worse, the district courts—as currently structured—can hinder the
Federal Circuit from effectively developing technology- and industry-specific
patent rules. The district courts can err in their factual findings in ways that are
not easily detected by an appellate court seeing a cold and established record. As
such, the Federal Circuit might improperly rely on district courts’ factual findings
to come to particular legal conclusions, possibly technology- and industry-specific
ones. These conclusions may very well be unjustifiable in the face of the actual
facts, causing an injustice in the particular case. Moreover, conclusions that are not
well supported in fact might have a broader impact by creating opportunities for
misapplication in future cases. For example, if the Federal Circuit is under the
misimpression—via a district court—that little downstream research is likely in a
particular technology, it might more readily give a broader reading to the patent’s
claims—either literally or via the doctrine of equivalents—than it would have
done had it known correctly that downstream research is likely. The impact of
erroneous district court actions is further felt: even when the Federal Circuit can
detect error in district courts’ factual findings and legal conclusions, the Federal
Circuit’s resources are wasted if error is sufficiently widespread. In these
situations, the Federal Circuit’s time and energy is siphoned away from focusing
on the most complicated issues of patent law and deciding them properly.

75. Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate
Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 650–54 (1988).
76. Dreyfuss, supra note 29, at 47–50.
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Moreover, Rochelle Dreyfuss suggests that the Federal Circuit might have
molded its legal rules to fit the district courts’ lack of patent expertise, thereby
causing harm to patent law.77 She hypothesizes that the Federal Circuit has crafted
rigid or formalistic analytical approaches to many patent issues, such as claim
construction and nonobviousness, because it cannot scrutinize every substantive
outcome.78 According to Dreyfuss, this focus on district courts’ analytical
approaches obfuscates the substantive policies patent law ought to promote,
harming the quality of this area’s legal development.79 In many ways, formalism is
antithetical to any refined technology- and industry-specific patent law.
With this articulation of the district courts’ shortcomings, the next section
discusses how to improve the system of patent litigation, by fostering a mutually
beneficial relationship between the district courts and the Federal Circuit, thereby
enhancing the technology- and industry-specific development of patent law.
C. Improving the District Courts
Given that patent litigation is a complex system with the district courts as
one of its critical components, it is crucial to improve these courts. Bettering the
courts’ decision-making capabilities in patent cases and finding ways to harness
their institutional strengths vis-à-vis the Federal Circuit is critical to fostering
accurate technology- and industry-specific patent rules that foster innovation. This
section addresses how a beneficial symbiosis might be fostered between the
district courts and the Federal Circuit. This section’s suggestions are illustrative of
improvements that might be made, rather than exhaustive. These suggestions
nonetheless coalesce to focus on turning the district courts into patent laboratories
for the Federal Circuit, in the sense that they should carefully collect case,
technological, and industry facts in each patent case; strive to apply the most
appropriate legal rules to those facts; and serve up these factual and legal
determinations to the Federal Circuit for further refinement. In turn, the Federal
Circuit ought to defer to the district courts’ factual findings so long as they are not
clearly erroneous and use its bird’s-eye view to refine technology- and industryspecific patent law.
In light of district courts’ importance, a first step toward enhancing the
quality of patent litigation is to improve the decision making in which those courts
engage. In other work, I recommend taking account of patentography—the
geography of patent disputes—to improve district courts’ factual and legal
decision making.80 There, I propose making patent suits proper only in the district
77. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 802–04.
78. Id. at 802–03; accord Rai, supra note 52, at 1037.
79. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 803. For other critiques of the Federal Circuit’s formalism, see
Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 123 (2005); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003).
80. Fromer, supra note 5.
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for the principal place of business of any of the defendants in a case (with a safety
valve to avoid due process concerns in a minute number of cases).81 Beyond
nearly eliminating forum shopping, so constraining venue should improve district
courts’ decision making by tending to cluster patent cases of particular
technologies or industries in a limited number of districts. Industries tend to
cluster around geographic areas, such as the pharmaceutical industry in New
Jersey and the software industry in Silicon Valley and the Boston and Seattle
areas.82 Because of industries’ natural geographic clusterings, lawsuits that must be
filed in defendants’—industry players’—principal place of business would mean
that more industry- or technology-specific patent suits ought to coalesce in
districts with relevant industry clusters. Under my proposed venue rules, it would
likely entail, for example, clusters of pharmaceutical patents suits in the District of
New Jersey and software patent suits in the Northern District of California, the
District of Massachusetts, and the Western District of Washington.83 A simulation
of the hypothetical distribution of all of the actual utility patent cases filed in 2005
under my proposal confirms such clustering effects for numerous technologies
and industries.84
When this clustering effect obtains, a handful of district courts would
adjudicate many patent cases in particular technologies or industries. The
proficiency they would thus develop would help them serve both as skilled fact
finders in developing the case record and as patent laboratories for tailoring patent
law to promote innovation in their particular clustered technologies or
industries.85 Moreover, judges, juries, and other legal actors located in an industry
or technology cluster are likely to have more background knowledge about that
industry or technology than jurors located in arbitrary areas.86 This better
understanding might, for example, be because they work in that area, have
neighbors or family working in that area, read more stories about that area in the
local newspaper, or possess tacit knowledge.87 It is more useful to harness this
typically elevated background knowledge in a district with industry clusters than to
locate patent suits in arbitrary locations, such as the current preponderance of
software patent cases in the “no bytes’ land” of the Eastern District of Texas and

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Court Locator, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2011)
(providing a map of federal district courts).
84. Fromer, supra note 5.
85. I argue also that this system is preferable to a set of district courts specializing in patent
law, as some have proposed. Rai, supra note 43. What patent law needs for more accurate, efficient,
and thoughtful judicial resolution of patent cases is not a set of district courts handling only patent
cases, but enough district courts that, in addition to seeing their usual host of cases, tend to see
enough patent cases of particular industries or technologies. Fromer, supra note 5.
86. Fromer, supra note 5.
87. Id.
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pharmaceutical cases in the District of Delaware.88
Harnessing patentography would go a long way toward improving district
courts’ factual and legal determinations. However, it would probably make more
marked improvements with regard to bench trials than jury trials. Even with
average elevated background knowledge, jurors almost never have the repeated
exposure to patent cases that district court judges would. Moreover, even if jurors
would have average elevated background knowledge were patent suits to cluster
by industry or technology, some number of jurors would still have little to no such
background knowledge. There is, therefore, good reason to worry about jurors’
abilities to decide the ever-critical facts in a patent case properly.
One way to protect the system of patent litigation from these
unknowledgeable jurors would be to mandate that district courts use specialverdict forms in jury trials of patent cases.89 A mandated special-verdict form
specifying separately the factual issues the jury must determine would have two
important benefits. First, it would crisply communicate to the jury each factual
issue they must determine, which would foster justifiable findings.90 This
communication ought to obviate the need for complicated instructions to the jury
on the relevant patent law.91 Second, if each factual issue is sufficiently articulated
separately, post-trial and appellate review of the jurors’ individual factual
conclusions would be eased. Pertinently, a special verdict with sufficiently
differentiated issues would permit a reviewing court a (minor) peek inside the
black box of jury findings by enabling surgical reversals of jury error rather than
wholesale reversals requiring full-blown new trials.92
Assuming these changes would lead to improved fact-finding in the district
courts (as well as better tailored legal conclusions), it would be productive to
ensure that the Federal Circuit grants high degrees of deference to the district
courts’ factual findings.93 In that vein, those issues of patent law that have been
labeled legal but are principally factual—like claim construction—ought to be
relabeled as factual questions. Additionally, those factual issues informing legal
issues—like the elements of nonobviousness—should also be granted sufficient
deference.

88. Id.
89. See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 723–24 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (encouraging the use of special-verdict forms (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a))). Now, the use of
special-verdict forms in these cases is permissive. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
90. Structural Rubber Prods., 749 F.2d at 724.
91. R.H. Baker & Co. v. Smith-Blair, Inc., 331 F.2d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 1964).
92. McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1356.
93. Congress might specify the degree of deference required for the various patent issues. Cf.
Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 919
(2004) (discussing how Congress might mandate the Federal Circuit’s deference to the PTO on
particular legal questions).

Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete)

322

11/7/2011 10:16 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:2

A renewed focus on fact-finding in the district courts and the Federal
Circuit’s deference to those facts absent clear error might also encourage the filing
of amicus curiae briefs in patent cases in the district courts. By highlighting key
aspects of the technology and industry at issue, these briefs would assist the
district courts determining the relevant facts with accuracy.
By using these and other techniques, the district courts’ power in finding
facts—of each case, the associated patented technology, and the relevant
industry—could be maximized. The district courts would thereby serve as patent
laboratories for the Federal Circuit, by queuing up relevant facts and doing their
best to apply patent law accurately to promote innovation for the relevant
technology and industry. The Federal Circuit—with its expertise in the law of
patents—would supervise these patent laboratories, by providing guidance and
refining patent law.
CONCLUSION
In their book, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley articulate an essential insight
about the necessity for technology and industry specificity in patent law, so as to
encourage the various types of innovation that happen in different industries and
with different technologies. To them, the locus of technology- and industryspecific development of patent law ought to be in the courts. In this regard, they
focus almost exclusively on the Federal Circuit. In this Article, I supplement their
work by arguing that the district courts ought to be an integral part of their story,
given their important role in patent litigation. Although district courts currently
underperform in their handling of patent cases, they can be improved so as to turn
them into reliable patent laboratories, interacting beneficially with the Federal
Circuit to refine and improve patent law in technology- and industry-specific ways.

